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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Michael Douglas White appeals from the district court's order revoking his
probation, contending the district court denied his due process right to confront
witnesses at the revocation hearing.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In 2010, the state charged White with felony driving under the influence.
(R., pp.26-27, 43-44.) White pied guilty and the court imposed a unified five-year

sentence with two years fixed and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.46, 61-64.) At
the conclusion of the jurisdictional review period, the court placed White on
probation. (R., pp.71-76.)
In December 2013, the state charged White with driving under the
influence and driving without privileges in Kootenai County Case No. CR-201324814 ("2013 Case").

(R., p.104.)

As a result, the state filed a motion for

probation violation, alleging White violated his probation by committing two new
crimes.

(R., pp.102-103.)

After taking judicial notice of the probable cause

determination and related court minutes in the Case 2013, the district court found
White violated his probation.

(See generally Tr., pp.6-10.) The court revoked

White's probation and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.121-123.) White filed a timely
notice of appeal. (R., pp.126-127.)
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ISSUES
White states the issues on appeal as:
1)
Did the district court violate Mr. White's right to due process
when it denied him the right to confront witnesses and lowered the
State's evidentiary burden during the probation evidentiary
hearing?
2)
Is the district court's finding, that Mr. White violated the
terms of his probation, clearly erroneous?
(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
At the revocation hearing, the court considered the court minutes and
probable cause determination made in the criminal case that served as the basis
for the state's probation revocation allegation. White had the opportunity to
present evidence at the revocation hearing, but did not. Has White failed to show
his right to confrontation was violated at his probation revocation hearing?
2.
Has White failed to establish the district court applied the incorrect legal
standard in determining he violated his probation or that documents from another
case, which are relevant to the probation violation alleged, do not qualify as
evidence or are insufficient to support a finding that White violated his probation?
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ARGUMENT
I.
White Has Failed To Establish He Was Denied His Due Process Right To
Confront Witnesses At His Probation Revocation Hearing

A.

Introduction
White contends his due process right to confront witnesses at his

probation revocation hearing was violated.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11.) More

specifically, White argues that the state failed to "provide any justification for
failing to produce witnesses, and, due to that error, the district court was not able
to weigh the State's interest in failing to produce witnesses against [his] right to
confront witnesses." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) White's argument fails because it
presumes that the state was required to produce a witness in order to establish
that White violated his probation. The state was not, however, required to do so.
That the state proved White's probation violation through documentary evidence
from the probable cause determination in the 2013 Case does not mean White
was deprived of his due process right to confront that evidence as White had the
opportunity to call witnesses at the revocation hearing and challenge the state's
evidence. His failure to do so cannot form the basis of a due process violation.

B.

Standard Of Review
The admission of evidence at a probation revocation hearing is reviewed

for an abuse of discretion while the "determination whether constitutional
requirements have been satisfied is subject to free review." State v. Rose, 144
Idaho 762, 765, 171 P.3d 253, 256 (2007) (citations omitted).
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C.

Because White Had The Opportunity To Challenge The Evidence Against
Him, He Cannot Establish A Due Process Violation In Relation To His
Probation Revocation Hearing
Prior to White's probation revocation hearing, the state filed a motion to

take judicial notice "of the Magistrate Court's finding of probable cause following
a preliminary hearing held on February 21 5 \ 2014 that [White] committed the
crime of felony DUI as well as the earlier finding of probable cause by the
Magistrate Court that the defendant committed the crime of DWP as alleged in
the March 5, 2014 Report of Probation Violation." (R., p.116.) At the revocation
hearing, the state did not call any witnesses, but relied on its prior motion to take
judicial notice as the evidence in support of its probation violation allegations.
(Tr., p.3, Ls.15-25.) In response, White did not dispute that he had the ability to
confront witnesses at the preliminary hearing, but contended he had a separate
right to confront witnesses at the probation revocation proceeding.

(Tr., p.6,

Ls.15-17 ("certainly there was a hearing in front of the magistrate on that where
we were allowed to question the witnesses and that sort of thing"); p.7, Ls.13-14
(expressing right to confront witnesses at revocation proceeding); p.8, Ls.5-9
(same).) The court granted the state's request to take judicial notice and found
White violated his probation by driving under the influence as alleged in the 2013
Case. 1 (Tr., p.7, Ls.11-12 ("I'm taking judicial notice of what's in this file."); p.9,
Ls.1-5.) The court thereafter revoked White's probation. (Tr., p.15, Ls.5-6.)

1

The court did not find a violation based on the allegation that White drove
without privileges because the state did not present any evidence in relation to
that allegation. (See Tr., p.9, Ls.5-21.)
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White asserts he was denied his right to confrontation at his probation
revocation hearing because the state failed to offer any reason for failing to call
witnesses and, as a result, the district court could not find good cause for
depriving him of his right to confront witnesses.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11.)

Although there is no Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses in relation to a
probation revocation hearing, a probationer does enjoy a Fourteenth Amendment
due process '"right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses' unless the
district court 'specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation."' Rose,
144 Idaho at 766, 171 P.3d at 257 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
489 (1972)). While White is correct in his assertion that the state did not provide
any justification for not presenting witnesses at his probation revocation hearing,
the question presented in this case is whether the state was required to do so or
whether it could proceed based on the documentary evidence from the 2013
Case, which formed the basis of the alleged probation violations in this case.
Because the state could proceed in this manner, and because White had the
I

opportunity to challenge the state's evidence, he has failed to show any due
process violation at is probation revocation hearing.
The due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses at a
parole revocation hearing was established by the Supreme Court in Morrissey,
408 U.S. 471, and was extended to probation revocation proceedings in Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (holding "that a probationer, like a parolee,
is entitled to a preliminary and final revocation hearing, under the conditions
specified in" Morrissey).

In deciding what process is due in revocation
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proceedings, the Court first noted the well-established principle "that due process
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands."

Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481.

For revocation proceedings, the

"situation demands" the equivalent of a "preliminary hearing to determine
whether there is probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that the
arrested parolee has committed acts that would constitute a violation of parole
conditions."

kl at 485.

"At the hearing the parolee may appear and speak in his

own behalf; he may bring letters, documents, or individuals who can give relevant
information to the hearing officer."

kl

at 487. In addition, "[o]n request of the

parolee, [a] person who has given adverse information on which parole
revocation is to be based is to be made available for questioning in his

kl

presence."

This request may, however, be denied "if the hearing officer

determines that an informant would be subjected to risk of harm if his identity
were disclosed," in which case the individual "need not be subjected to
confrontation and cross-examination."

kl

The Court characterized the second stage of revocation proceedings as
the "Revocation Hearing." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487. This hearing should be
held "prior to the final decision on revocation" "if [the hearing] is desired by the
parolee."

kl

at 487-488.

"This hearing must be the basis for more than

determining probable cause; it must lead to a final evaluation of any contested
relevant facts and consideration of whether the facts as determined warrant
revocation."

kl

at 488. At the Revocation Hearing, the parolee "must have an

opportunity to be heard and to show, if he can, that he did not violate the
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conditions, or, if he did, that circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation
does not warrant revocation."

kl

Although the Court in Morrissey articulated the "nature of the process that
is due" in parole revocation proceedings, it left to the states the responsibility of
establishing the procedures necessary to satisfy due process. 408 U.S. at 484,
488. To guide the states, the Court summarized the "minimum requirements of
due process" as including:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure
to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard
in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d)
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless
the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a
traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial
officers or lawyers, and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as
to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
In concluding its opinion in Morrissey, the Court made two significant
points regarding the limited nature of the due process right available at
revocation proceedings. First, the Court stated:
We emphasize there is no thought to equate this second stage of
parole revocation to a criminal prosecution in any sense. It is a
narrow inquiry; the process should be flexible enough to consider
evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would
not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
Second, the Court said it had "no thought to create an inflexible structure
for parole revocation procedures." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 490. Rather, the due
process requirements it articulated were not intended to "impose a great burden
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on any State's parole system" or facilitate "delaying tactics and other abuses
sometimes present in the traditional adversary trial situation."

kl

For example,

the Court noted, a parolee "[o]bviously ... cannot relitigate issues determined
against him in other forums, as in the situation presented when the revocation is
based on conviction of another crime."

kl

"Several Idaho cases further shape the contours of proper due process in
the context of probation revocation." State v. Scraggins, 153 Idaho 867, 871,
292 P.3d 258, 262 (2012).

In fact, before the United States Supreme Court

addressed the issue, the Idaho Supreme Court "presciently adopted standards
similar to those announced in Morrissey, holding that certain procedures must be
followed in any probation proceeding," including the right "(1) to present favorable
evidence; (2) to examine all the material contained in any pre-sentence
investigation report, and (3) to explain and rebut adverse evidence." State v.
Chapman, 111 Idaho 149, 721 P.2d 1248 (1986) (citing State v. Edelblute, 91
Idaho 469, 480, 424 P.2d 739, 750 (1967)). Post-Morrissey, and with Morrissey
in mind, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the proposition that due process
requires "that certain information must be gathered by certain individuals," noting
"such a rigid rule would render inflexible that which must be flexible." Chapman,
111 Idaho at 152, 721 P.2d at 1251 (emphasis original). The Court explained:
What is important, and what is constitutionally required, is
that the district court be permitted to evaluate a broad range of
information. To that end, ... , and for that very reason, did this
Court in [prior cases] state that a defendant has the right to present
evidence and explain and rebut any adverse evidence.
Requiring a certain individual to collect certain information
does not fulfill any constitutional purpose.
The teachings of
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Morrissey, Gagnon, Edelbute, and [State v. Moore, 93 Idaho 14,
454 P.2d 51 (1969)] are clear. They unequivocably [sic] state that
the reason for the attachment of due process protection to
proceedings such as we have here is to assure that the finding of a
parole or probation] violation will be based on verified facts and that
the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate
knowledge of the parolee's behavior. That purpose is not furthered
by requiring that certain sources of information be acquired by
certain individuals, and we so hold.
Chapman, 111 Idaho at 152, 721 P.2d at 1251 (emphasis original, brackets,
quotations and some citations omitted).
Consistent with the foregoing principles, a district court may consider a
wide variety of information in relation to a revocation decision and is not subject
to the restrictions set forth in the Idaho Rules of Evidence. State v. Egersdorf,
126 Idaho 684, 889 P .2d 118 (Ct. App. 1995) ( citations omitted) ("In a probation
revocation proceeding, the Idaho Rules of Evidence do not apply."); see also

I.R.E. 101 (e)(3) (rules of evidence inapplicable to proceedings "granting or
revoking probation"). Although the admission of evidence at a revocation hearing
is not "unbridled," evidence is admissible "if it is found to be credible and
reliable."

State v. Nez, 130 Idaho 950, 953, 950 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Ct. App.

1997). Thus, for example, Idaho appellate courts have affirmed the admission
and consideration of laboratory reports showing positive drug test results when
those reports are determined to be credible and reliable.

See, sLll., State v.

Farmer, 131 Idaho 803, 805-806, 964 P.2d 670, 672-673 (Ct. App. 1998);
Egersdorf, 126 Idaho at 685-686, 889 P.2d at 119-120.
At the revocation hearing, White did not challenge the credibility or the
reliability of the probable cause finding or the court minutes related to the 2013
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Case.

(See generally Tr.)

Instead, White claimed he had "a right of

confrontation." (Tr., p.7, Ls.21-22.) The district court's acceptance of the finding
and court minutes from the 2013 Case did not, however, deprive White of that
right because nothing prevented White from producing witnesses to challenge
that evidence. The opportunity to do so is all that due process requires. See
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487 ("On request of the parolee, [a] person who has given
adverse information on which parole revocation is to be based is to be made
available for questioning in his presence."); Chapman, 111 Idaho at 152, 721
P.2d at 1251 (holding that the due process rights related to probation revocation
proceedings are "not furthered by requiring that certain sources of information be
acquired by certain individuals" and noting that "Chapman had full opportunity to
submit evidence on these matters").
White relies on Farmer, supra, to support his assertion that the district
court was required to engage in a balancing test before considering the state's
documentary evidence in lieu of live testimony.

(Appellant's Brief, p.9.)

The

state acknowledges that the Court in Farmer engaged in such an analysis;
however, the question is whether the Court was required to do so. The state
submits it was not because the good cause analysis only applies when the
probationer or parolee is prevented from questioning an adverse witness. This is
consistent with the right as it was articulated in Morrissey where the Court noted
that the parolee could request to question an adverse witness, but the hearing
officer could prevent such questioning if he "determine[d] that an informant would
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be subjected to risk of harm if his identity were disclosed." Morrissey, 408 U.S.
at 487.
In Rose, although the Idaho Supreme Court referenced the "good cause"
exception to confrontation, it did not address the question presented in this case
- whether the district court must engage in a good cause analysis when it
considers documentary evidence. 144 Idaho at 766, 171 P.3d at 257. Rather,
the question before the Court in Rose was whether the Supreme Court's decision
in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), "applies to a probationer's right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses in a revocation hearing." 144 Idaho at
765, 171 P.3d at 256. The Court concluded it did not, stating: "Due process
does not require that probationers be granted an absolute right of confrontation,
but only a limited right, subject to denial for good cause.

Nothing in Crawford

indicates that the due process standard set out in Morrissey is no longer valid."
1.9.:_ at 767, 171 P.3d at 258 (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489).

Notably, the

Court also reiterated that
due process is flexible in scope, and the reliability it demands
necessarily invites inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the
evidence sought to be admitted and whether it possesses enough
earmarks of reliability.
A probation decision involves an
individualized evaluation of the probationer's personality and
circumstances. The process must be flexible enough to consider
evidence that might not be admissible in a criminal prosecution. A
court is presumed to be able to ascertain the relevancy and
reliability of the broad range of information and material presented
to it and to disregard the irrelevant and unreliable.
Rose, 144 Idaho at 767, 171 P.3d at 258 (quotations and citations omitted). The
Idaho Supreme Court's reiteration of these fundamental principles supports the
state's position that the good cause analysis is limited to circumstances in which
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the probationer or parolee is prevented from confronting adverse evidence. 2
Indeed, the district court specifically relied on the Idaho Supreme Court's
decision in Rose in proceeding as it did. (Tr., p.8, Ls.17-24.)
Because the district court did not prevent White from calling any
witnesses, White was not deprived of his right to confront the evidence against
him and the court was not required to engage in a good cause analysis.
Even if a good cause analysis was required, any error in not explicitly
conducting such an analysis was harmless because White had the opportunity,
at the preliminary hearing in Case 2013, to cross-examine the witness whose
testimony served as the basis for the court's determination that White violated his
probation by driving under the influence. White conceded as much to the district
court (Tr., p.6, Ls.15-17), and the court minutes from the 2013 Case, which the
district court took judicial notice of, support that co~clusion (augmentation). 3
"Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights
shall be disregarded."

I.C.R. 52.

Given the limited and flexible due process

confrontation right that exists in relation to probation revocation proceedings, and

This view is also consistent with those decisions holding that the confrontation
right at sentencing is limited and a defendant is not deprived of his constitutional
rights when the court considers information attached to a presentence report.
See, .sL9.:., Stat~ v. Martinez, 154 Idaho 940, 947, 303 P.3d 627, 634 (Ct. App.
2013) ("the us1e of hearsay information in the PSI report does not violate a
defendant's due process right to confrontation").
2

3

Contemporaneous with his brief, White filed a motion to augment the record
with the minutes from the preliminary hearing held in the 2013 Case and the
court's order binding him over to district court in that case. (Motion to Augment
the Record and Statement in Support Thereof dated November 3, 2014.) The
Idaho Supreme Court granted White's motion. (Order Granting Motion to
Augment the Record dated November 10, 2014.) Copies of the documents
augmented to the record are attached hereto as Appendix A
12

given the fact that White previously confronted the witness he apparently wanted
to confront a second time at the revocation hearing, this Court should find any
error in failing to conduct a good cause analysis to be harmless in this case.

11.
There Was Substantial Competent Evidence From Which The District Court
Could Conclude, By A Preponderance Of The Evidence, That White Violated His
Probation By Driving Under The Influence
A.

Introduction
White contends the district court erred in finding he violated his probation

by driving under the influence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-16.) First, White argues
that by considering the court minutes and probable cause finding from the 2013
Case, the district court "lowered the State's burden from a preponderance
standard to a probable cause standard." 4 (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-14.) Second,
White asserts that the district court's finding that he "violated the terms of his
probation was clearly erroneous because there was no evidence to support that
finding."

(Appellant's Brief, p.15.)

Both of White's arguments fail.

That the

district court considered evidence from a hearing where the standard of proof
was lower than a preponderance does not establish that the court applied that

The state could not find any authority that compels a preponderance of the
evidence standard. It appears White could not either as his argument that such a
standard is required is based on an analogy to the standard for parole
revocation. (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) Notably, in State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388,
389, 744 P.2d 116, 117 (Ct. App. 1987), the Court of Appeals noted: "proof of a
probation violation beyond a reasonable doubt is not required. Here, both parties
agreed to a preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof. Accordingly, we
need not decide whether any different standard is appropriate." The state will
assume for the sake of argument in this brief that the preponderance of the
evidence standard applies even though there is no clear authority that such a
standard is required. However, the absence of clear authority on this point
undermines White's claim that the district court applied an incorrect standard.
4
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same standard to its revocation decision.

With respect to White's claim that

there was "no evidence" to support a finding that he violated his probation, White
offers no authority to support his contention that "a probable cause determination
and minutes of the preliminary hearing are not evidence and are not enough to
establish, under the preponderance of the evidence, that [he] did in fact commit a
new offense."

(Appellant's Brief, p.16.)

Even if the Court considers White's

argument, the evidence considered by the district court was more than adequate
to satisfy a preponderance of the evidence standard and supports the district
court's finding that White violated his probation.

B.

Standard Of Review
"[A] district court's finding of a probation violation will be upheld on appeal

if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding."

State v.

Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009). This Court will accept the
district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous" but "may freely
review the district court's application of constitutional principles in light of the
facts found."

C.

kl at 104, 233 P.3d at 35 (citations omitted).

There Was Substantial Evidence To Support The District Court's Finding
That White Violated His Probation
As noted, the evidence considered by the district court in finding White

violated his probation by driving under the influence was the court minutes and
probable cause determination in the 2013 Case. (Tr., p.9 Ls.1-5; Appendix A.)
White first argues that "his right to due process was violated when the district
court revoked his probation based on a different judge's determination made
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under a lower evidentiary standard than a preponderance of the evidence."
(Appellant's Brief, p.13.) The district court's reliance on the court minutes and
the probable cause determination in the 2013 Case falls far short of showing the
district court applied an incorrect standard in making its revocation decision.
There is nothing that would preclude a court from finding that the same evidence
that establishes probable cause also satisfies a higher standard of proof and
there is nothing in the record to support White's claim that the district court
applied a probable cause standard to its decision. Cf. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 490
("Obviously a parolee cannot relitigate issues determined against him in other
forums[.]"). The fact that the district court relied on the same evidence is not
enough to conclude that the court applied an erroneous legal standard. White's
reliance on Brandt v. Idaho Comm'n for Pardons and Parole, 135 Idaho 208, 16
P.3d 305 (Ct. App. 2000), does not support a contrary conclusion. (Appellant's
Brief, p.13.)
Brandt was on parole when he was arrested on a misdemeanor. Brandt,
135 Idaho at 209, 16 P.3d at 306. "[O]n the day of his arrest he was also served
with a parole violation warrant alleging two violations, one for the misdemeanor
charge and one for consumption of alcohol."

kl

A magistrate found probable

cause to support the new misdemeanor charge and set bond but refused to
release Brandt "because he was also being held on the alleged parole violations
for which bond is not authorized."

kl

In response, "Brandt filed a petition for writ

of habeas corpus alleging that his due process rights had been violated because
he had not been given a hearing to determine whether there was probable cause
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to believe that he had violated his parole."

kl

The magistrate denied the

petition, reasoning that the probable cause determination for the misdemeanor
that formed the basis for one of the alleged parole violations "satisfied Brandt's
right to a hearing to determine the existence of probable cause for the parole
violation warrant."

kl

The Idaho Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding the

probable cause determination in the misdemeanor proceeding was insufficient to
meet the Morrissey "requirement for a preliminary probable cause determination
on the reported parole violations." Brandt, 135 Idaho at 210-211, 16 P.3d at 307308. The Court of Appeals reached this conclusion "because the procedures for
a probable cause determination in a misdemeanor case do not include the
procedural safeguards mandated by Morrissey" since the misdemeanor probable
cause hearing may be ex parte and does not require the defendant's presence.

kl at 211,

16 P.3d at 308. The Court of Appeals' determination in Brandt that the

court failed to comply with the procedural requirements under Morrissey has no
bearing on White's claim that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard
in its revocation decision. 5

5

In citing Brandt, White also contends that the district court's "procedure"
reduced the state's burden of proof and claims that the "district court's reliance
on the magistrate's probable cause determination did not comport with the
procedural safeguards set forth in Morrissey, because at the final revocation
hearing there 'must be the basis for more than determining probable cause; it
must lead to a final evaluation of any contested facts."' (Appellant's Brief, pp.1314 (quoting Morrissey. 408 U.S. at 487-488).) The state fails to understand how
the district court's reliance on the documents associated with the 2013 Case
violated any procedure required by Morrissey. The essential procedure required
by due process is notice and an opportunity to be heard - those elements were
satisfied in this case at both the preliminary hearing and the revocation hearing.
16

White next contends that, even assuming his due process rights were not
violated, "the district court's finding that [he] violated the terms of his probation
was clearly erroneous because there was no evidence to support that finding."
(Appellant's Brief, p.15.) According to White, "a probable cause determination
and minutes of the preliminary hearing are not evidence and are not enough to
establish, under the preponderance of the evidence, that [he] did in fact commit a
new offense." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) This Court should decline to consider
this claim because White cites no authority in support of the proposition that the
documents the court considered "are not evidence." See Murray v. State, 156
Idaho 159, _ , 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014) (quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho
259, 263, 923 P.3d 966, 970 (1996) (noting an issue will not be considered if
"either authority or argument is lacking" and declining to consider appellant's
claim because he failed to "provide[] a single authority or legal proposition to
support his argument").
Moreover, White did not object to the district court's consideration of the
information from the 2013 Case on the basis that it is not "evidence." While
White complained that the state "didn't offer a transcript or any evidence for [the
court] to evaluate independently" (Tr., p.4, Ls.9-10), such a complaint is not the
same as a claim that the proffered documents were not evidence at all or that the
court could not consider the evidence. This Court should therefore decline to
consider White's complaint that the 2013 Case documents are not "evidence."
See State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 885, 119 P.3d 653, 660 (Ct. App.
2005) (citations omitted) ("Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1), a party
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opposing proffered evidence must make a timely objection stating the specific
ground of objection unless the specific ground is apparent from the context. An
objection on one ground will not preserve a separate and different basis for
excluding the evidence.").
Even if this Court considers White's argument, he is incorrect in his
assertion that the 2013 Case minutes and the order binding White over are not
properly considered as evidence.

Documents may clearly be admitted and

considered as evidence at a probation revocation hearing, Nez, 130 Idaho at
955, 950 P.2d at 1294 ("A business record should be received into evidence
unless the trial court doubts its reliability."); this is true even in a criminal trial,
see,~. State v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, 363-365, 283 P.3d 107, 110-112 (Ct.
App. 2011) (penitentiary packet admissible under public records exception to
establish persistent violator allegation). White's claim to the contrary lacks merit.
White is also incorrect in his assertion that the challenged documents do
not establish White drove under the influence.

The court minutes reflecting

Officer Daniel Koontz's testimony at the preliminary hearing in the 2013 Case
about the circumstances under which he arrested White for driving under the
influence were sufficient to support the district court's finding that White violated
his probation by driving under the influence. Cf. State v. Wilson, 127 Idaho 506,
510-511, 903 P.2d 95, 99-100 (Ct. App. 1995) ("there is no requirement that a
judgment of conviction be a prerequisite to finding a probation violation when the
alleged violation is the commission of a crime"). White has failed to demonstrate
any error in this determination.

18

Because White has failed to show error in the process afforded at his
revocation hearing or in the district court's determination that he violated his
probation, White is not entitled to relief.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order revoking White's probation.
DATED this 2th day of January 2015.

(JE$SICA M. LORELLO
l99Puty Attorney General
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STATE OF IDAHO

vs.
MJCHA)J:L DQVG!,.MJ V[HTfE
DOB:

FEl,ONY C.MJJZ IJ CR~~W13-00'..l4814

ORD.l1:R
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COUNT 2 - DJUVlNG WU]:!OIJT JJRIVlLEGEs-- WH!ill!!GD.i\;!

Amended t o : - - - - - . ~ - - - - - - , - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - -
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(Specify d,lsmissed charge(s) on al.love Jine, j_f otbet charges still pending)

[ ] Preliminary hen.dng having bee·n waived by the defendant on tile above listed cbarge(s),
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fortJJ above has/ have been committed, and thci:e is sufficient cause to believe the named defondaut is guilty
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ff JS FUR1'J1ER ORDERED that the defendant be admitted to bail h1 the athount of$_"
:md ls
co.uuuitted to the custody of lh,e Kootenai County S1wriff pending the giving of such bail.
[ ] befeJJdmit WM advlsed of the c)Jarges and powntial penaltielJ and of defendant' l5 rights, and having waived hl,9/hcr
constitutional rights to: a) t1fol by jury; b) remain silent; ond c) confront witnesses, thcreafferpled guilty to the
charge(s) contained in the Information filed by the Prosecuting Attorney.
lT JS FURTI-Hm ORDERED thal all prel\fal motkms Ju t.bi~ case shall be tiled not Jater than 42 days aft{lr the date
of this order unless ordered otJ1erwisc. All such p:r:et:rial motioJJS Ju this matter slrnH be accompanied by a brief 1n support of the
mot.ion, aud a notice of hearing for a date scheduled tbrottgh the Court.
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